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In the Supreme Court of the 
State of Utalt 
In the Matter of the Adoption of 
DIANE DEVERAUX, a Minor, 
v. 
RHEA WALKER BROWN, 
Protestant and Appellant, 
and 
In the Matter of the Adoption of 
GENE DEVERAUX, a Minor, 
v. 
RHEA WALKER BROWN, 
Protestant and Appellant. 
NO. 8055 
NO. 8056 
RESPONDENTS' PETITION AND BRIEF 
ON REHEARING 
Come now the petitioners, Respondents herein, and 
move this Honorable Court for a rehearing and reconsid-
eration of its opinion and judgments in the above entitled 
,causes, and for grounds, and as a basis for such motion 
respondents rely upon the following: 
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1. The opinion of the Court is contrary to law. 
2. The Court erred in holding that the natural mother 
was not .. judicially deprived" of the custody of the children 
within the meaning of Sec. 78-30-4, U. C. A., 1953, so as to 
dispense with her consent in these adoption proceedings. 
3. The Court erred in failing to recognize that under 
the provisions of Sec. 55-10-31, U. C. A., there cannot be 
a .. pennanent" deprivation of custody of a child that would 
prevent a parent, who had been so deprived, from proceed-
ing to recover the custody of said child, except only in cases 
of commitments to (1) the district court or (2) the state 
industrial school. 
4. The Court erred in apparently limiting adoptions 
of children without the consent of the parents to those cases 
where the parents have been judicially deprived of custody, 
the children have been placed with a children's aid society 
and the Juvenile Court has consented to their adoption. 
5. The Court erred in interpolating into Sec. 78-30-4, 
U. C. A., the words .. absolutely and permanently" and in 
defining said words. 
6. The Court erred in construing Sec. 55-10-43, U. C. 
A., as permitting the consent of the Juvenile Court to be 
substituted for that of living parents in adoption proceed-
ings. 
7. The Court erroneously construed the decree of the 
Juvenile Court in the custody proceedings and erred in con-
sidering rna tters dehors the record in such construction as 
well as relying upon the unsupported decision of the Idaho 
Cot1rt in Jain v. Priest. 
8. That the opinion and judgments of the Court as 
rendered, predicated upon the erroneous determination of 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
3 
the foregoing propositions is erroneous and should be va-
cated and set aside. 
Wherefore, Respondents respectfully submit that are-
hearing should be had and the decision revised as to both 
law and fact, and that a miscarriage of justice will occur 
if these causes are not reversed. 
S. E. BLACKHAM, 
Attorney for Respondents 
ARGUMENT 
In the Court's opinion in these cases the "determinative 
question'' is stated as follows: "Did the Juvenile Court 
when it deprived the parents of the custody of their children 
for cruelty and neglect and placed them with the State De-
partment of Welfare 'for foster home care, treatment and 
supervision' Wlder its continuing jurisdiction, divest them 
absolutely and permanently of all their rights to the chil-
dren so as to make their consent Wlllecessary in adoption 
proceedings?" 
The consent of the father to the adoptions having been 
obtained in these proceedings, it would seem that the ques-
tion properly posed is only whether the natural mother was 
judicially deprived of the custody of the children and dives-
ted of all rights to them. 
A careful examination of the decree of the Juvenile 
Court will show that no rights of any nature were preserved 
by it in the natural mother. The decree provided that 
" • • • the parents of said children be and ·they are 
hereby deprived of the custody of said children." (Empha-
sis ours.) The only part of the decree touching the natu-
ral mother, in definite and certain terms deprived her of 
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the custody of the children. No provision of that decree 
either preserved in her rights of any nature or imposed up-
on her any continuing obligations or duties toward them. 
She was completely and absolutely deprived of the custody 
and control of the children, had no further authority over 
them, no rights as to visitation and no right whatever to 
interfere with them. And this situation would and does 
continue absolutely, permanently, irrevocably and forever 
so long as the decree of the Juvenile Co.urt remains in full 
force and effect. In this sense the authorities cited by us 
in our main brief (pp. 25-26) unquestionably sustain the 
fact that the decree "permanently" divested the natural 
mother of all rights to the children. 
We can conceive of no rights left in the natural mother 
by the decree of the Juvenile Court. It is true that she had 
the right to go back to that court and petition the court to 
modify or revoke the decree and restore the children to her, 
but that would seem to be the only right she had, and that 
right exists not by reason of anything contained in the de-
cree, but by virtue of Sec. 55-10-31, U. C. A., 1953, which 
provides t~at "No judgment or decree of the juvenile court 
shall operate after the child becomes twenty-one years of 
age and all orders, judgments and decrees, except commit-
ments to the district court or to the state industrial school 
may be modified or revoked by the court at any time be-
fore the child becomes twenty-one years of age." 
The only judgment or decree that the juvenile court 
can make in any case, whether it be placing the children 
with a children's aid society (as suggested by this Court in 
its opinion) or making any other provision concerning them, 
that is not subject to .modification or revocation and which 
would· "absolutely and .permanently" deprive a parent of 
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custody in the sense these words are obviously used in the 
opinion, would be to commit them either to the district 
court or to the state industrial school. Surely this Court 
does not mean to say that only in such a case are the pro-
visions of Sec. 78-30-4, U. C. A., 1953, dispensing with con-
sent in adoption cases, intended to apply. But this is the in-
escapable effect of the decision in this case which has the 
practical effect of saying that no adoptions can be had in 
this state (except in the very limited cases of con1mitment 
to the district court or the industrial school) except with 
the consent of the natural parents. Certainly Sec. 78-30-4, 
U. C. A., cannot be construed so narrowly. If this be the 
construction a death blow will be struck at the policy this 
Court enunciated in In reAdoption of D - - -; 252 P. (2d) 
223, as follows: 
"Fourth: Public policy favors the adoption of 
children who are left without parental refuge. Once a 
child has been cast adrift and is without responsible 
care, the policy of the law should be to assist in every 
way in establishing a satisfactory parent-child and fam-
ily relationship. Adoptive parents should not be dis-
couraged by a construction of the law which would 
cause them to fear the consequences of accepting a 
child because of the knowledge that the fate of their 
efforts would be at the will of the natural parent." 
It may be argued that this is not necessarily the result 
because this Court in its opinion said: "If the Juvenile 
Court had intended to permanently deprive the parents of 
the custody of their children it could have placed them with 
a children's aid society and appointed such society the guar-
dian of such children under the provisions of Sec. 55-10-40, 
U. C. A., 1953, and that society could, under the provisions 
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of Sec. 55-10-43, have gotten the consent of the Juvenile 
Court to place the children for legal adoption into the homes 
procured for them by the society. This the Juvenile.Court 
did not do." Does this imply that the consent of the Ju-
venile Court may be substituted for that of the natural par-
ents? This certainly cannot be the case in view of Sec. 78-
30-4, U. C. A., 1053, which provides that "A legitimate child 
cannot be adopted without the consent of the parents, if 
living, • • • except that consent is not necesary from 
a father or mother who has been judicially deprived of the 
custody of the child on account of cruelty, neglect or de-
sertion; • • •" This statute obviously requires the 
consent of the living parents in every case except where the 
parents have been judicially deprived of custody, and in 
such case obviously the consent of no person is required, 
not even that of the Juvenile Court. We have searched ar-
duously, but in no case, under statutes similar to those of 
this state, have we found any authority even remotely sug-
gesting that the consent of a juvenile court may be substi-
tuted for that of a natural parent. 
If by the quotation the Court intended to imply that 
had the Juvenile Court done as suggested, the natural moth-
er's rights in the children would have been any more effect-
ively or permanently cut off than they were by the decree 
entered by that court in this case, we respectfuly submit 
the Court is in error. Had the Juvenile Court done that 
very thing, the rights of the natural mother would not have, 
in any respects, been any different than they are or were 
under the instant decree of that court. She could have done 
anything under that decree that she could have done under 
the instant decree and that decree, under the provisions of 
Sec; 55-10-31, U. C. A., 1953, would have been no more ef-
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fective in cutting off her rights "permanently'' than the 
instant decree. 
For instance, suppose we change the decree of the Ju-
venile Court by the insertion of three words, "permanently" 
and "and adoption" as follows: 
"IT IS THEREFORE ADJUDGED and DECREED 
by the Court that Ellis Deveraux and Rhea Walker 
Deveraux, the parents, of said children be and they are 
hereby permanently deprived of the custody of said 
children. 
"IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, by the Court that 
said Larry, Blaine, Gene and Dianne Deveraux be and 
they are hereby declared and adjudged to be depend-
ent, neglected children within the meaning of the laws 
of Utah, in such cases made and provided, and that sub-
ject to the continuing jurisdiction of the Court, the 
said children be committed to the Utah State Depart-
ment of Public Welfare for foster home care, treatment. 
and supervision and adoption. And it is further or-
dered by the Court that the father. Ellis Deveraux pay 
$100.00 per month for their support and maintenance." 
(Tr. 54, 246.) (Inserted words in bold face). 
Would not the natural mother's rights in the children 
be exactly the same. under such a decree as they are under 
the instant decree? If not, in what way are they different? 
Certainly under such a decree she could petition for a modi-
fication or revocation of the decree the same as she could. 
have done in the instant case. Where, then, is there any 
difference of substance between the situation projected by 
the Court and that of the instant case? Is not the effect 
then of the Court's opinion logically that no adoptions can 
be had in this state without the consent of the .living par-
ents? It seems that such a rule is what the Protestant 
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herein seeks to have established. If it is the rule, then of 
course, Sec. 78-30-4, U. C. A., is for all practical purposes 
read out of the statutes, for it can then be applied only in 
those cases where the juvenile court commits the child either 
to the district court or to the state industrial school. In 
all other cases the parent can petition the court to modify 
or revoke the decree and restore custody of the child to him. 
In the opinion of the Court in posing the determinative 
question involved, as quoted at the outset of this brief, the 
Court has interpolated in Sec. 78-30-4, U. C. A., the words 
"absolutely and permanently." These words are not in the 
statute and we submit may not properly be interpolated 
therein in the connotation of these words as used in the 
opinion of the Court. The statute requires only that the 
parents be "judicially deprived'' of the custody of the chil-
dren, not that they be "judicially deprived absolutely and 
permanently" of such custody. If the word "permanently" 
is given its proper connotation in such a context, as shown 
by the authorities cited in our main brief (pp. 25-26) and 
above referred to, then we think that the statute might be 
construed so as to require a permanent deprivation of cus-
tody as distinguished from a temporary one, but if the con-
notation of "permanently" is meant in the extreme sense 
to which it appears to be carried by the Court in its opinion, 
viz., that the children are placed thereby irrevocably be-
yond the control of the Juvenile Court, and custody cannot 
be regained by the parent, then we submit that a proper con-
struction 9f the statutes does not and cannot require an "ab· 
solute and permanent" deprivation . 
. ... In its opinion this Court· further .states "That our. stat.; 
utes~do not contemplate that ev.-:ry judicial deprivation of 
parents to the custody of their children is a permanent dep:-
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rivation is borne out by Sec. 55-10-41, U. C. A., 1953, which 
provides for proceedings to return the custody to the par-
ents when circwnstances have changed.'' We have no quar-
rel with this statement, but if it is the existence of the right 
to proceed for the return of custody to the parents that 
stamps the decree of the court _as not being a . permanent 
deprivation, then, as· we have shown above, there are only 
two ways in which a permanent deprivation can take place 
and they are by commitment to the district court or to the 
state industrial school; consequently, a permanent depriva-
tion could not result by placing the children with a children's 
aid society as this Court indicates the Juvenile Court might 
have done under the provisions of Sec. 55-10-40, U. C. A. 
It seems rather striking that this Court should in one sen-
tence exemplify under Sec. 55-10-40 what it considers would 
have been a permanent deprivation by placing the children 
with a children's aid society, and in the same paragraph 
only five sentences later, citing Sec. 55-10-41, the very_.next 
section, would use the same situation* to demonstrate that 
a deprivation under those same circumstances would. not 
be permanent. 
The fact that the Juvenile Court encouraged the ·Pro-
testant "to believe that when she rehabilitated herself and 
was capable of taking care of her children they would. be 
returned to her, writing: "Of course your future prospects 
and conduct will determine the results to the children' ", 
cannot stamp the decree of the court as not being a per-
manent deprivation of custody. This was not the action of 
the Juvenile Court, but that of the Protestant's attorney, 
who had secured a divorce for her from the . other parent. 
*Sections 55-10-40; 55-10-41 and 55-10-43 all deal with the situ-
ation where the child is placed with a children's aid society. 
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of the children involved, and from whom she apparently 
was getting an acknowledgment of final payment for his 
services and who was volunteering some opinions concern-
ing her and the children. His words that "of course, your 
future prospects and conduct will determine the results as 
to the children" were at best merely an expression of what 
was inherent in the law concerning the case, irrespective 
of what was written to her and of which the Protestant was 
undoubtedly familiar as she had previously availed herself 
of those provisions of the law. Again, if the Juvenile Court 
had, as suggested by this Court, placed the children with a 
children's aid society and had authorized it to secure adop-
tion the Protestant's "future prospects and conduct'' could, 
even in such case, "determine the results as to the children" 
yet if such had been the case the Court's opinion indicates 
that such a decree would have amounted to a permanent 
deprivation of custody. The thing that we are trying to say 
is that, analyzed in its true perspective, the statement qu<r 
ted as made by the Juvenile Court could have no effect 
whatsoever in determining whether the court considered 
that its order depriving the parents of custody of the chil-
dren was permanent or merely temporary, because he was 
only expressing what the statutes, irrespective of the de--
cree, already provided. 
So long as the decree of the Juvenile Court remains un-
modified and unrevoked, the Protestant can have no right 
to custody of the children or any other rights in them. The 
decree, therefore, can be nothing else but a permanent dep-
rivation of the custody of the children. True, the Protestant 
could have sought to modify the decree and possil,ly may 
have succeeded upon a proper showing, but the right to seek 
and obtain such a modification would exist by virtue of the 
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statutes and not by virtue of anything contained in the de-
cree or by virtue of anything said by the Judge long after 
he had entered the decree. If the decree were revoked or 
modified, then the rights of the Protestant in the children 
would necessarily have to be defined by the new decree and 
governed thereby. \Ve earnestly submit ,that tested by any 
recognized standard of construction or logic, the decree of 
the Juvenile Court in this case permanently deprives the 
Protestant of the custody of the children. 
We, of course, do not mean to say that the Juvenile 
Court cannot enter a decree that would be considered as a 
temporary deprivation of custody and one upon which an 
adoption without parental consent could not be predicated. 
An example of such a decree is the modified decree of the 
Juvenile Court of Sevier County which was before this Court 
in State v. Sorensen, 132 P. (2d) 132, and Jensen v. Sevy, 
134 P. (2d) 1081. In the proceedings before the Juvenile 
Court upon the hearing for modification of the original de-
cree, which deprived Fern Jensen, the father of the child, 
of its custody, the Juvenile Court entered an order out of 
which both of the above cases grew, vacating all previous 
orders and providing: "That the Court retains jurisdiction 
of this matter * * * and in the event said petitioner 
Fern Jensen, deports himself becomingly between the date 
hereof and June 1, 1942, then and in that event said peti-
tioner, Fern Jensen, shall have and enjoy the sole custody o{ 
said minor child. * * *"This court, in JenS!en v. Sevy 
concerning this order, said, p. 1087: 
"The validity or legal effect of that order or writ 
must therefore be passed upon by the District Court. 
Petitioner contended that he claimed custody, under 
and by virtue of the order, not in derogation of it. But 
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the order revealed that the right of petitioner to the 
custody of his child had not been f'mally determined by 
the Juvenile Court. That order which was in its nature 
interlocutory the court specifically retaining jurisdic-
tion, committed the custody of the child to the defend-
ants in the habeas corpus proceeding until June, 1942, 
at which time, upon a showing by the petitioner that 
he had in the meantime deported himself becomingly 
the court would award him the custody of the child. 
There is no question as to the power of Juvenile Court 
to make such an order or as to the validity thereof." 
(Emphasis supplied). 
Thus, by the language of this Court the difference be-
tween a permanent deprivation and a temporary or inter-
locutory deprivation is made crystal clear. In the one case 
the decree deprives the parent of custody and makes no 
provision under which the parent is to regain custody and 
is of indefinite duration (which is the decree in ilJhe instant 
case) --in the other, provision is made for the return of 
custody of the child to the parent, upon certain conditions, 
within a limited, temporary and certain period. 
In ~the instant case the Juvenile Court, by its decree, 
retained no jurisdiction concerning the right of the parents 
to the custody of the children, but only with respect to the 
commitment of the children to the Department of Public 
Welfare for foster home care, treatment and supervision, 
whereas in the Jensen case, supra, the Juvenile Court "re\o 
tains jurisdiction of this matter .. * .. *· .. *"; (Emphasis sup-
plied) , which is the equivalent of retaining jurisdiction for 
further orders, both as to the right of the parents to custody 
as well as to the ·care of the children in the event the cus-
tody be not awarded back to the parents. 
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In this case, just as in the. Jensen case, the District 
Court (Judge Nelson) had to pass on the validity or legal 
effect of the decree of the Juvenile Court and found as a 
fact that the dcree of the Juvenile Court permanently de-
prived the natural parents of the custody of the children 
(R. 17-18) and concluded as a matter of law that the de-
cree judicially and permanently deprives the natural parents 
of the custody of the said children on account of neglect by 
said natural parents (R. 19) thus bringing this case square-
ly within the provisions of Sec. 78-30-4, U. C. A. We sub-
mit that in applying correct principles of law with respect 
to the decree of the Juvenile Court, as we have shown, the 
District Court was compelled to such finding .and conclu-
sion of law, and it should be sustained by this Court. 
As an additional ground, however, we submit that this 
Court is in error in construing the. decree of the Juvenile 
Court in the first place, and in the second place in consider-
ing the letters of Judge Alder (either as judge or as attor-
ney for Protestant) in construing the decree. The decree is 
not ambiguous and needs no construction to determine. its 
meaning, but if it is ambiguous it cannot be interpreted in 
the light of statements made by the court dehors the rec-
ord and a long time. after the decree was pronounced. It is 
universally held and is a general. rule that where the Iang-
uage .. of a judgment. or decree is clear and unambiguous, 
neither the pleading or the findings or verdict, nor matters 
dehors the record, may be resorted to to interpret it and 
that such a judgment depends upon its own terms .and ex-
traneous documents cannot ·be written into it by inference 
or reference. Holingsworth v. Hicks, (N. Mex.) 258 P. 2d 
724;. Hinderlider v. Canon Heights Irr. & Reservoir Co. 
(Colo.) 185 P. 2d 325; Kent v. Smith, (Nev.) 140 P. 2d 357; 
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Paxton v. McDonald, (Ariz.) 236 P. 2d 364; Slavich v. Sla-
vich, (Cal.) 239 P. 2d 100; Foster v. City of Augusta, (Ken.) 
256 p. 2d 121. 
On the basis of these decisions, to which scores could 
be added, it would seem to be clear that this Court erred in 
its opinion in considering the letters of Judge Alder in con-
struing the decree of the Juvenile Court under consideration 
herein. We call the attention of the Court also to the fact 
that these letters were received by the District Court over 
the strenuous objections of Respondents' Counsel (R. 88-
91; 112-114). 
This Court in its opinion relies strongly upon Jain v. 
Priest, 30 Ida. 273, 164 P. 364, which is not supprted by any 
other decisions, and quotes from that decision in support of 
the conclusions reached herein. But we respectfully sub-
mit that the quotation used is pure dicta with respect to no 
issue before that court and furthermore is subject to the 
same criticism as the opinion in this case. To base a deci-
sion thereon would be to impose error upon error. Even so, 
however. that case is readily distinguishable as follows: (1) 
the order of the Probate Court is not set forth verbatim 
so that it may be compared with the decree of the Juvenile 
Court in ·this case; (2) the order appears (as stated by this 
Court in its opinion) to have provided for the placement of 
the children in a children's home "until the parents would 
reform and become fit to be entitled to the children again." 
(Emphasis supplied). The decree did not so provide in the 
instant ·case; (3) in the Jain case "the probate judge, the 
appellants, the representative of the society at Lewiston, 
and everyone else concerned. understood that the order was 
not a final order, permanently depriving the parents of the 
custody of the children, but merely an order temporarily 
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depriving them of such custody until such time as they 
should reform and convince the court that they were again 
entitled to the children." These facts must have been proved 
in that case otherwise they would not have appeared in the 
statement of facts in the opinion, and must have been shown 
to have existed in the minds of the persons mentioned at 
the time of the entry of the order. There is no such show-
ing in the instant case; (4) in the Jain case the ·court said, 
p. 368, "In order to authorize the probate court to make an 
order of adoption without the consent of the parents, it must 
appear in the record before the court that the case comes 
within some of the exceptions mentioned in the statute. 
* * * No such showing was made before the probate 
court * *." In the instant case such a showing was made 
before the District Court who so found, as shown by refer-
ence to the specific finding referred to above. 
Moreover, in the Jain case it is significant that in a 
much later decision (1943) on habeas corpus the same court 
denied a writ and upheld an adoption where the parent was 
given no notice whatever of a prior proceeding determining 
the child to be an abandoned child, or of the adoption pro-
ceedings, merely upon the basis that there was ample evi-
dence to support the court's finding of abandonment in the 
case itself. Finn v. Rees, 141 P. 2d 976. 
We submit that this Court erred in its conclusion that 
the natural mother was not "judicially deprived'' of the cus-
tody of the children within the meaning of Sec. 78-30-4, U. 
C. A., 1953, so as to dispense with her consent in these adop-
tion proceedings. 
We earnestly and sincerely submit that these are im-
portant cases, involving, as they do, serious problems af-
fecting the well being and future welfare of these and per-
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haps scores of other children "cast adrift * * * with-
out responsible parental care"; that the Court's opinion is 
in error and the entire proceedings should be reheard and 
reconsidered by this Court. 
CONCLUSION 
Wherefore, petitioners pray that a rehearing and re-
argument be granted, that the judgment of the District 
Court be sustained, and that the opinion and judgment of 
this Court be vacated and set aside. 
Respectfully submitted, 
S. E. BLACKHAM, 
Attorney for Petitioners 
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